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Professional Responsibility: Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Association: Guideline for a Constitutional
Lawyer Solicitation Rule-Does Shapero Open the
Door to In-Person Solicitation?
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' the United States Supreme Court rendered
the first of several rulings defining the scope of permissible state regulation
of lawyer advertising. Bates refuted many of the well-established arguments
against lawyer advertising. No longer would reputation alone be considered
sufficient advertising for the lawyer. 2 Also, advertising was no longer con-
trary to lawyer professionalism. 3 States may not absolutely ban lawyer adver-
tising.4 States may, however, regulate advertising that is false, deceptive or
misleading.5 The public remains largely unsophisticated concerning legal ser-
vices and is therefore generally unable to verify the truthfulness or the ac-
curacy of lawyer advertising. Thus, the state is justified in regulating lawyer
advertising to assure that the public is not misled and that the advertising
flows freely and cleanly.6
The United States Supreme Court, however, has taken a fundamentally dif-
ferent approach to the issue of lawyer solicitation.' In Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Association,8 the Court held that a state may discipline a lawyer for in-
person solicitation under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the state
has a right to prevent, 9 Bates is distinguished from Ohralik in that advertising
presents information without exerting any direct pressure on the recipient for
action. In-person solicitation, however, pressures and demands the client to
take immediate action.'"
1. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2. See Brosnahan & Andrews, Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: In the Public Interest?,
46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 423, 423-24 (1980).
3. See generally, H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 210, 210-25 (1953).
4, The American Bar Association's (ABA) prohibition of lawyer advertising had been in
effect since the inception of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility in 1908. See ABA
CANNoNs OF PROESSIONAL ETincs, No. 27 (1908).
5. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
6. Id. at 384.
7. Courts often have a difficult time distinguishing between "advertising" and "solicita-
tion." In general, courts use "solicitation" to refer to direct, in-person contact and "advertise-
ment" to describe contact through the media. See Note, The Expanding Constitutional Protec-
tion of Commercial Speech: Attorney Advertising After Zauderer, 1986 DET. C.L. REv. 199,
204 n.46. Prior to Shapero, if the Court labeled the lawyer activity as "advertising," states could
regulate it but not prohibit it. If the Court characterized the activity as solicitation, states could
ban it. See Perschbacher & Hamilton, Reading Beyond The Labels: Effective Regulation of
Lawyers' Targeted Direct Mail Advertising, 58 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 255, 256 (1987).
8. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
9. Id. at 449,
10. Id. at 457.
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Targeted, direct mail solicitation by lawyers presents an issue that does not
uniformly qualify as either advertising or solicitation." Targeted, direct-mail
solicitation differs from advertising because targeted mail provides specific
information to a recipient who the lawyer has reason to believe is in need
of that information. Targeted, direct mail solicitation also differs from in-
person solicitation because the lawyer is not physically present to pressure
the recipient into a decision.
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 2 the United States Supreme Court
held that states may regulate, but cannot ban, targeted, direct mail solicita-
tion ("targeted mail") by lawyers.' 3 State rules prohibiting lawyers from par-
ticipating in targeted, direct mail solicitation may now be challenged as un-
constitutional. The American Bar Association, Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 7.3, prevents lawyers from soliciting employment by mail.' Oklahoma
adopted Rule 7.3 in March of 1988. In light of Shapero, the ABA, along
with Oklahoma and twenty-three other states, must return to the drawing board
to draft a constitutional rule.'
5
This note analyzes Shapero and delineates the scope of permissible state
regulation of targeted mail. Shapero provided parameters for state regulation
that were extensions of principles enunciated in previous lawyer advertising
and solicitation cases. Additionally, this note will explore whether Shapero
opens the door to some type of in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain and
suggests methods for regulating solicitation. Finally, this note provides a pro-
posed draft for a new Oklahoma Rule 7.3. Oklahoma should adopt a solicita-
tion rule that will encompass the Court's well-established principle that states
may only ban solicitation through the least restrictive means available to fur-
ther a substantial governmental interest.
11. "Direct Mail" is mail usually containing advertising material that is sent to a large number
of possible customers. RANDOM HousE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGISIH LANOuAO£ 559 (2d ed. 1983).
"Targeted Direct Mail" is direct mail sent to a specific group of potential clients. See Adams
v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 617 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. I11. 1985), aff'd,
801 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1986).
12. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
13. Id. at 1923.
14. A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-
person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term 'solicit' includes contact in person, by telephone
or telegraph by letter or other writing or by other communication directed to a
specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars
distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind pro-
vided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might
in general find such service useful.
ABA MODEL RuLEs OF PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 7.3 (1984).
15. See 59 OKLA. B.J. 1725 (July 2, 1988). The Board of Governors requested that the
Oklahoma Bar Association Model Rules Committee make the necessary modification to Oklahoma
Rule 7.3 to comply with Shapero. See also Stewart & Nelson, Hawking Legal Services 74 ABA
J. 44 (Aug. 1, 1988) (at least 24 states have adopted model rules similar to Rule 7.3).
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Background
Several federal and state courts had granted constitutional protection to
targeted mail prior to Shapero.'6 Shapero flowed logically from the United
States Supreme Court's earlier decisions concerning lawyer advertising and
solicitation. Like other types of lawyer speech, targeted mail is constitutionally
protected commercial speech.' 7 States may ban commercial speech, including
targeted mail, only if the restriction advances a substantial state interest through
the least restrictive means available.' 8
Commercial Speech Framework
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 9 the Court held that states may not pre-
vent lawyers from advertising because advertising is a form of commercial
speech.20 States may not categorically restrict all commercial speech because
it enjoys first amendment protection.2 States may, however, rely on what
has come to be known as the "commercial speech doctrine" to regulate lawyer
advertising.
22
The commercial speech doctrine recognizes that a state has an interest in
assuring the truthfulness of commercial speech.2 3 The doctrine balances the
consumer's first amendment right to the free flow of commercial information
against the state's interest in ensuring the truthfulness of the information.
24
16. See, e.g., Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Com-
mercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 487, 521 n.203.
17. 108 S. Ct. at 1923.
18. Id. at 1921.
19. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Two lawyers advertised their prices in an Arizona newspaper. Arizona
had a disciplinary rule which prohibited lawyers from advertising. The Court considered several
arguments against allowing lawyers to advertise. These arguments included: 1) the adverse effect
on professionalism; 2) the inherently misleading nature of lawyer advertising; 3) the adverse effect
on the administration of justice; 4) the undesirable economic effects of advertising; 5) the adverse
effect of advertising on the quality of service; and 6) the difficulties of enforcement. Id. at 368-79.
The Court dismissed all of these arguments as unacceptable reasons for suppressing all lawyer
advertising. Id. at 379.
20. Commercial speech is "speech of any form that advertises a product or service for profit
or for business purpose." See Maute, supra note 16, at 494. For a general discussion of lawyer's
commercial speech see Canby, Commercial Speech of Lawyers: The Court's Unsteady Course,
46 BROOKLYN L. RFv. 40 (1980).
21. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
22. Id.
23. J. NowAK, P. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNs-muoNA. LAw 912-13 (1986).
24. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). Pharmacists in Virginia advertised the prices of their perscription drugs. Virginia
had a statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising. The Court determined that the con-
sumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information outweighed the state's interest in
an absolute ban. The Court, however, recognized that the state did have a strong interest in
maintaining a high degree of professionalism among its licensed pharmacists. States could regulate
commercial speech by placing reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the speech,
by prohibiting advertising which might be false, misleading, or illegal. For a more thorough
discussion of the history of the commercial speech doctrine, see Stoltenberg & Whitman, Direct
Mail Advertising by Lawyers, 45 U. PrrT. L. Rnv. 381 (1984).
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Under the commercial speech doctrine, states may restrict lawyer advertising
that is false, deceptive or misleading. Furthermore, states may also restrict
the time, place and manner of lawyer advertising.2"
The Court has applied this commercial speech framework to two cases in-
volving in-person solicitation. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 6 the
Supreme Court held that the state may discipline a lawyer for soliciting under
circumstances likely to pose dangers or result in misconduct that the state
has a right to prevent. 27 The Court recognized that in-person solicitation creates
the likelihood of overreaching, the exertion of undue influence29 and the
potential for invasion of privacy.30 The Court held that the state has a substan-
tial interest in regulating lawyer conduct to protect clients from these poten-
tial problems.
3'
In the second case, In re Primus,2 the Supreme Court held that a lawyer's
non-pecuniary solicitation, containing political association or expression, was
not subject to regulation under the commercial speech doctrine.5 3 Unlike com-
mercial solicitation, political expression is subject to the full protection of
the first amendment.14 In Ohralik, the Court held that states may prohibit
lawyers from conducting in-person commercial solicitation because of the
potential for misconduct. Under Primus, however, states may not proscribe
solicitation involving political expression because of the potential for miscon-
duct. A state may discipline a lawyer only if the lawyer's political expression
actually results in misconduct.3 5
25. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
26. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Ohralik, a lawyer, personally solicited the business of a young woman
who was the victim of a car accident while she lay in traction in the hospital. He also paid
an uninvited call on another young woman who was injured in the accident. He used a concealed
tape recorder in an attempt to bind the young women to their agreements to let him represent
them. Both women eventually discharged Ohralik and informed the Ohio Bar Association about
Ohralik's behavior.
27. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
28. See Perschbacher & Hamilton, Reading Beyond the Labels: Effective Regulation of Lawyers'
Targeted Direct Mail Advertising, 58 U. CoLo. L. REv. 255, 260 n.33 (1987) ("Overreaching"
is "aggressive competition among lawyers for clients, which leads to lawyers approaching clients
at times when the clients are in no condition to properly consider retention of a lawyer, for
example, immediately after an accident.").
29. Id. n.34 (Undue influence is "misuse of position of confidence or taking advantage of
a person's weakness, infirmity, or distress to change improperly that person's actions or decisions."),
30. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460.
31. Id. at 461.
32. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). Primus, a cooperating lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), conducted a meeting to inform three women that they could sue a doctor who had
mistakenly sterilized them. Primus then sent a letter to one of the women informing her that
the ACLU would represent the woman against the doctor. The South Carolina disciplinary rules
prohibited such solicitation.
33. Id. at 434.
34. See Stoltenbert & Whitman, supra note 24, at 392.
35. Primus, 436 U.S. at 434. See also Rabin, Attorney Solicitation: The Scope of State Regula-
tion After Primus and Ohralik, 12 J.L. REFoRM 144, 154 (1978),
344 [Vol. 42
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss2/8
NOTES
Central Hudson Test
Although the Court applied the commercial speech doctrine to both Ohralik
and Primus, these cases were so fact-specific that the Court's evaluation of
permissible state regulation was essentially ad hoc.16 In Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 37 the Supreme
Court developed a more structured framework for analyzing the scope of per-
missible state regulation of commercial speech. The Central Hudson test
established the following criteria for determining a state's freedom to regulate:
(1) whether the commercial speech was lawful and not misleading; (2) whether
the state advanced a substantial interest in the regulation; (3) whether the
state's regulation directly promoted the substantial interest; and (4) whether
the state's regulation exceeded the bounds of necessity to serve its interest. 38
The critical component of the test is the fourth question. If the state may
use a less restrictive means of promoting a substantial governmental interest,
then a ban of a particular type of commercial speech cannot survive. 9 In
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,40 the Court applied the Central
Hudson test to state proscription of targeted advertising. The state had failed
to establish that its ban on the lawyer's truthful advertisement directed at
a targeted audience directly advanced a substantial governmental interest
through the least restrictive means possible. 4' The Court held that states may
not restrict truthful, nondeceptive targeted advertising.42 States may, however,
regulate this advertising, but unlike restriction, regulation is not subject to
"the least restrictive means" test. States may regulate targeted advertising in
a manner that is "reasonably related to the state's interest in preventing decep-
tion of consumers. ' 4 3 Thus, the Zauderer Court modified the Central Hudson
test. As long as the regulation reasonably relates to the state's interest in pro-
tecting the public from deception, overreaching, undue influence, or fraud,
the regulation is permissible even if other means can be hypothesized.
44
36. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 16, at 501. ("Beginning with [the] solicitation cases, the
Court embarked on fact-specific, essentially ad hoc evaluations of state regulations under the
commercial speech doctrine.").
37. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
38. See Ringleb, Bush & Moncriet, Lawyer Direct Mail Advertisements: Regulatory Environ-
ment, Economics, and Consumer Perceptions, 17 PAC. L.J. 1199, 1209 (1986).
39. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
40. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). Zauderer, a lawyer, advertised in a local newspaper his willingness
to represent women who had been injured from the use of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.
The advertisement told readers not to assume that it was too late to sue the manufacturer. The
Ohio disciplinary rules prohibited such advertising.
41. Id. at 644-45. See also Maute supra note 16, at 505.
42. 471 U.S. at 647.
43. Id. at 651.
44. Id. at n.14.
1989]
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Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,"- the United States Supreme Court
addressed whether states may ban lawyers from conducting targeted mail
solicitation for pecuniary gain. In a 6-3 opinion, 4 the Court held that targeted,
direct mail solicitation is a mode of communication that states can regulate,
but not ban.
4
7
In 1985, Richard D. Shapero, a member of Kentucky's integrated Bar
Association, sought approval from the Bar for a letter which was to be used
by him for direct mail solicitation. The letter was to be sent to potential clients
against whom a foreclosure suit had been filed. The letter read:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed
on. If this is true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal
law may allow you to keep' your home by ORDERING your
creditor [sic] to stop and give you more time to pay them.
You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
for FREE information on how you can keep your home.
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able
to do for you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter.
Remember it is FREE, there is NO charge for calling.
48
The Bar did not find the letter false or misleading. Nevertheless, it declined
to approve the letter. The Bar based its disapproval on the then existing
Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i). The rule prohibited the mailing
of any written advertisement precipitated by an occurrence or a particular
event involving or relating to the potential client as distinct from the general
public.
49
The Bar determined that the rule violated the first amendment and the prin-
ciples in Zauderer.50 The Bar recommended that the Kentucky Supreme Court
45. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1916.
46. Id. The opinion consists of three parts. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion with
whom Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Kennedy, White, and Stevens join in Parts I and II. Justice
White and Stevens dissented in Part III. Justice O'Connor wrote the dissenting opinion with
whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined.
47. See Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1923.
48. Id. at 1919.
49. See Id. at 1919 n.2. Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) provided:
A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee only
"if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to whom it
is also sent or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it is not prompted
or precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the ad-
dressees as distinct from the general public.
50. Id. at 1920. The opinion does not provide the principles from Zauderer on which the
Bar relied. However, a thorough reading of Zauderer presents four principles on which the Bar
may have grounded its recommendation. First, a state may only restrict commercial speech that
is not false or deceptive if it can show a substantial governmental interest. 471 U.S. at 638.
Second, lawyer advertising is a category of commercial speech which enjoys first amendment
protection. Id. at 637. Third, regulation of commercial speech may not be broader than is
[Vol. 42
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amend the rule to conform to the holding in Zauderer that states may not
ban truthful, targeted advertisements. 5' Heeding the recommendation, the
Kentucky Supreme Court replaced the rule with ABA Rule 7.3. Both rules
banned targeted mail solicitation for pecuniary gain without requiring a fin-
ding that the solicitation was false or misleading. The Kentucky Supreme Court,
however, provided no explanation for how ABA Rule 7.3 corrected any defi-
ciency in the previous rule.52
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue
of whether a state's categorical prohibition of targeted mail was consistent
with the first amendment. Because the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted ABA
Rule 7.3 which prohibited lawyers from soliciting persons with known legal
problems, the specific issue before the Court was whether ABA Rule 7.3 was
constitutional. 3 The Court reversed the lower court's decision to ban Shapero's
targeted letter.
5 4
New Relevant Inquiry
In Part II of the Shapero opinion, the majority used the same framework
and analysis found in previous lawyer advertising and solicitation cases.5 This
analysis stated that potential clients are susceptible to the possibility of abusive
solicitation. However, these clients will feel equally overwhelmed by their legal
troubles and have the same impaired capacity for good judgment, regardless
of whether the lawyer solicits them by an untargeted or targeted letter, or
a newspaper advertisement.56 Whether the solicitation affects potential clients
whose condition makes them susceptible to undue influence is no longer a
valid question. The relevant inquiry is whether the mode of communicating
the solicitation poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit such suscep-
tibility.
5 7
Targeted, Direct Mail Solicitation v. In-Person Solicitation
The balance of the Shapero opinion compared in-person solicitation with
targeted mail solicitation. The Court distinguished Ohralik from Shapero.
reasonably necessary to prevent deception. Id. at 658. Finally, states may not discipline lawyers
for using printed advertising containing truthful and nondeceptive information to solicit legal
business from potential clients. Id. at 647.
51. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
52. Id.
53. ABA Rule 7.3 stated in part that a lawyer may not solicit for pecuniary gain any specific
recipient.
54. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
55. Id. at 1921. First, lawyer advertising is a category of constitutionally protected commercial
speech. Second, it is well established that the first amendment principle governing state regulations
of lawyer solicitations for pecuniary gain is that states may only restrict truthfufl and nondeceptive
commercial speech if it can show a substantial governmental interest. The state may only restrict
such speech through means that directly advance the governmental interest. Finally, state regula-
tion designed to prevent the "potential for deception and confusion ... may be no broader
than reasonably necessary to prevent the" perceived evil. Id.
56. Id. at 1922.
57. Id.
19891
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Ohralik's "categoric[al] ban" on all in-person solicitation resulted for two
reasons. First, in-person solicitation is "rife with possibilities for overreaching,
invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud.""
Second, in-person solicitation is not visible or open to public scrutiny.
Therefore, any attempt to regulate such solicitation, short of an absolute ban,
would be futile.
59
The Court acknowledged that, unlike print advertising or a targeted letter,
in-person solicitation is coercive due to the physical presence of the lawyer.
In-person solicitation demands an immediate yes-or-no answer.1 On the other
hand, a recipient of a targeted letter does not undergo such coercion. The
recipient has time for reflection and the exercise of choice. A pestering ad-
vocate is not breathing down the recipient's neck. Ceasing to read the letter
will avoid further attack on the recipient's sensibilities. The recipient is free
to consider the letter or discard it. 1 Moreover, a targeted letter does not in-
vade the recipient's privacy any more than a similar letter mailed at large.
Rather, any invasion of privacy occurs when the lawyer learns about the reci-
pient's legal affairs, not when the recipient is approached.
6 2
A personalized letter to an individual with a specific legal problem also
presents a risk of deception. The recipient may overestimate the lawyer's
familiarity with his particular case. The letter might implicitly suggest that
the recipient's legal problem is worse than the facts would otherwise indicate.
Additionally, an inaccurately targeted letter could result in the recipient's believ-
ing that a problem exists where one does not. Finally, the letter may provide
erroneous legal advice.' 3
Nevertheless, the opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes do not justify
an absolute ban on targeted mail. States can regulate targeted mail through
more precise and far less restrictive means than a total ban." A state agency
may inherit increased responsibility in regulating targeted mail, but extra
burdens on the state do not justify a ban. Commercial speech decisions are
"grounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial information is valuable
enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the [cost of regulation].""3
No Deference to the State
In Part III of the Shapero opinion, a plurality considered whether Shapero's
letter was overreaching and unworthy of first amendment protection." Justice
Stevens and Justice White did not concur with this portion of the decision.
They argued deference to the state to make the initial determination of whether
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1922-23.
62. Id. at 1923.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1924.
66. See supra note 45.
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an individual lawyer's solicitation letter violated the first amendment." The
issue was whether Shapero's letter was overreaching due to its liberal use of
uppercase letters and use of assertions that amounted to "salesman puffery"
rather than affirmative or objective fact .
6
The Court held that a state has no substantial interest in regulating the
pitch or the style of a letter's type.69 Furthermore, the first amendment limits
a state's authority to regulate what information a lawyer may provide in a
letter. Regardless of the size of type or how much speculation it contains,
a letter cannot shout at the recipient or grab the recipient by the lapels.7"
Examples of misleading information that would justify a state's restriction
include undue emphasis on trivial or relatively uninformative facts and exag-
gerated assurances of client satisfaction.'
Methodology Incorrect
Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and Scalia dissented from the entire opin-
ion, urging the majority to reexamine the analytical framework for determin-
ing lawyer advertising and solicitation cases.72 Justice O'Connor noted error
in the Court's reasoning in lawyer advertising cases. The Court has concluded
that states may not ban the advertisement of professional services because
like consumer goods, the public has a right to a free flow of commercial in-
formation relating to professional services.7 She concluded, however, that
the analogy between professional services and standardized consumer products
was defective. A profession is different from an occupation because it entails
ethical obligations and standards of conduct that the market does not con-
trol. Lawyers have special expertise which gives them power and tempts them
to manipulate the justice system for their own benefit. Lawyers are, however,
public servants. Therefore, Justice O'Connor argued that the state had a par-
ticular interest in regulating lawyers that was different from regulating com-
mercial information concerning consumer goods.
74
Scope of Permissible Solicitation Regulation After Shapero
To determine the scope of permissible state regulation of lawyer solicita-
tion, Shapero must be compared with Primus, Zauderer and Ohralik. These
cases form a solicitation spectrum with Ohralik and Primus at opposite ends."
67. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924 (White, J. and Stevens, J. concurring and dissenting in part).
68. See Id. at 1924. "Call NOW, don't wait"; "[lit is FREE, there is NO charge for calling....
It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you."
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1925.
72. Id. at 1925 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, J., and Scalia, J. dissenting).
73. Id. at 1928-29.
74. Id. at 1928-30.
75. Ohraik is at one end of the solicitation spectrum because states may ban in-person
solicitation for pecuniary gain under circumstances that are likely to result in overreaching, un-
due influence, invasion of privacy, or fraud. Primus is at the opposite end of the spectrum because
1989]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Zauderer and Shapero fall in between.76 The majority did not cite Primus
in Shapero because Shapero did not involve political speech. Therefore, the
Primus holding that in most cases states may not restrict lawyer solicitation
involving political association or expression remains the law.
Change in Focus for Determining Substantial State Interest
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 7 was the basis for the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Shapero. In Zauderer, the Court held that the state failed
the Central Hudson test."' The state could not prove that the prohibition of
Zauderer's truthful and nondeceptive newspaper advertisement advanced a
substantial state interest through the least restrictive means possible."9 Likewise,
in Shapero the Kentucky Bar Association could not demonstrate a substantial
state interest in banning Shapero's letter. The Bar argued that targeted mail
should be banned because it is directed to a potential client with a known
legal problem, rather than to a person who might have the legal problem. 0
The Bar argued that a known audience raised the same concerns associated
with in-person solicitation.8"
The Shapero Court dismissed this argument and introduced a change in
the way a state may determine its substantial interest. As discussed above,
a state may no longer restrict lawyer solicitation based on the condition or
vulnerability of the potential client.82 The focus is whether the mode of solicita-
tion exploits the client's susceptibility regardless of the client's condition."
If the mode of solicitation presents a serious danger of exploiting a potential
client's susceptibility, the state may regulate the solicitation. Furthermore, the
Court noted that targeted mail is more efficient than general mail advertising
because it reaches individuals who actually need the legal services. The first
states may not ban in-person solicitation if the solicitation is in the form of political expression
or association.
76. Zauderer, which allowed targeted advertisements, and Shapero fall within these two
extremes. Neither case concerned political expression or in-person solicitation for commercial gain.
77. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
78. Id. at 647.
79. Id.
80. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921.
81. Id. at 1922.
82. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. But cf. OxLAuoA MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 7.3(c):
"[A] lawyer shall not contact or send a written communication to a prospective
client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if: (I) the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional and mental state of the
person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing
a lawyer."
83. Id. See also Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Commission, Md. Ct. App. No.
92, 8/10/88 (court interpreted Shapero to mean that the first amendment protects written modes
of solicitation regardless of the recipient's condition, so long as such communication is neither
false, misleading or overreaching.).
[Vol. 42
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concluded that a state may not prohibit lawyers from mailing a solicitation
letter to those who might find it most useful any more than a state may ban
targeted advertisements."
Letters Subject to Regulation
States may regulate letters which exaggerate a lawyer's familiarity with the
potential client's case. 8' A state may also regulate letters that suggest that
the legal problem is worse than the facts may indicate. Also, a state may
prohibit a lawyer from causing a potential client to believe that the client
has a problem that does not exist, or from giving incorrect legal advice."
A lawyer may not unduly emphasize trivia or relatively uninformative facts.
Additionally, a lawyer may not offer exaggerated assurances that the work
will satisfy the client.88 These examples of allowable state regulation have the
common denominator of the lawyer's conduct posing a serious danger of ex-
ploiting a potential client's susceptibility to undue influence, deception, fraud
or invasion of privacy.
Ambulance Chasing Still Banned
Of the cases on the solicitation spectrum, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion represents the strongest justification for state regulation of lawyer solicita-
tion. Attorney Ohralik's behavior was characteristic of ambulance chasing
at its worst.8 The Supreme Court cited Ohralik throughout Shapero to
distinguish in-person solicitation from targeted mail. In-person solicitation
is characterized by the potential dangers of overreaching, invasion of privacy,
exercise of undue influence and outright fraud.90 In Shapero, the majority
restated the holding of Ohralik as allowing states to ban "all" in-person
solicitation because it is not suitable for adequate regulation. 9' Ohralik,
however, held that states may ban in-person solicitation under circumstances
likely to pose such dangers.92
The Shapero majority's interpretation of Ohralik as banning "all" in-person
solicitation creates an ambiguous atmosphere for the definitive state regula-
tion of in-person solicitation. The critical inquiry for restriction is now whether
the "mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will ex-
ploit" a client's susceptibility to the dangers of overreaching, invasion of
privacy, undue influence and fraud. 93 Notwithstanding the Court's use of "all,"
84. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921.
85. Id. at 1921-22.
86. Id. at 1923.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1925.
89. See supra notes 8 and 25.
90. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922.
91. Id.
92. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 55, 79 and accompanying text.
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its emphasis on whether the methods of solicitation will exploit client suscep-
tibility indicates that it might be willing to consider in-person solicitation which
does not take advantage of such susceptibility. The quoting in Shapero of
the Ohralik holding as the banning of "all" in-person solicitation is also con-
fusing because of the Shapero Court's immediate reference to Justice Marshall's
concurrence in Ohralik and Primus.94 Justice Marshall stated that Mr. Ohralik's
behavior was objectionable because of the circumstances and means in which
he performed the solicitation, not because he solicited business for himself.9"
Thus, the Court's citing of Justice Marshall's concurrence in Shapero might
also be interpreted as a signal that the Court may allow in-person solicitation
that does not contain the distasteful elements of the Ohralik solicitation.
The seemingly confusing statement of the Ohralik holding in Shapero may
bewilder state bar associations attempting to redraft Rule 7.3. Apparently,
in-person solicitation such as Ohralik's may be banned. Nevertheless, the in-
quiry as to whether the mode of solicitation has the potential for exploiting
client susceptibility, and the favorable citation by the Shapero Court of Mar-
shall's Ohralik concurrence, is significant. Based on the new inquiry, the Court
could rule state restrictions on in-person solicitation that do not result in the
exploitation of a potential client's susceptibility unconstitutional.
Permissible In-Person Solicitation
The juxtaposition in Shapero of the new focus for determining permissible
regulation to the reference to Marshall's Ohralik concurrence could open the
door for some type of "benign in-person solicitation." 6 Marshall defined
"benign solicitation" as that which is "truthful and is presented in a noncoer-
cive, nondeceitful, and dignified manner to a potential client who is emo-
tionally and physically capable of reaching a rational decision." 91 The state
has a substantial interest in regulating lawyers to protect the public from fraud,
overreaching, undue influence and invasion of privacy. However, where
"honest, unpressured commercial solicitation is involved," 9s states may not
have a compelling interest to proscribe the free flow of this solicitation.
One mode of in-person solicitation that may not result in undue susceptibility
is the solicitation for business representation. A lawyer may solicit to represent
a businessperson in a legal matter relating only to the business. A lawyer could
not ask to represent the client in any legal problem unassociated with the
business. A legal problem related to business may be of considerable concern
to the businessperson. The nature of the business problem, however, is unlikely
94. The Court decided Ohralik and Primus on the same day. Justice Marshall wrote one
concurring opinion for both cases.
95. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922.
96. Id. The majority's new relevant inquiry was followed immediately by the quotation from
Marshall's concurrence in Ohralik.
97. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 472 n.3. See also Wishcamper, Benign Solicitation of Clients by
Attorneys, 54 WAsH. L. REv. 671-92 (1979).
98. Oralik, 436 U.S. at 472 n.3.
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to overwhelm the businessperson such that the person is unable to make a
reasonable decision on hiring a lawyer.99 Typically, the businessperson has
experience in dealing with lawyers. Business people also have more equal
bargaining power with lawyers than the public at large. This expertise and
bargaining power reduces the dangers of coercion and influence. The justifica-
tion for banning, rather than regulating, in-person solicitation was that it was
invisible, and therefore not susceptible to regulation. 100 As will be discussed
below, however, in-person solicitation for business representation is visible
and therefore may be regulated.
Methods of Regulation
Regulating Targeted, Direct Mail Solicitation
The Shapero Court suggested that states require lawyers to file targeted
letters with the state so that the state has the opportunity to supervise and
penalize actual abuses. The lawyer would be required to provide documents
to verify both the truthfulness of the alleged legal problem and how the lawyer
learned of the problems.'"' To prevent the potential for overreaching, the letter
could bear a label stating that it is a solicitation.0 2 Also, to protect against
fraud and deception, the state could require that the lawyer provide information
on how the recipient can report an inaccurate letter.' 3 The Court failed to
include one other possible regulation to guard against overreaching and undue
influence. States could require a "cooling off" period before a lawyer could
mail a letter. This "cooling off" period would prescribe a certain time period
after a disaster or other traumatic event before a lawyer could mail the letter. 4
State agencies, however, cannot be unreasonable in their regulation. Zauderer
provided that the regulation must be reasonably related to the state's interest
in preventing deception.'05 Moreover, the Court held in In re R.M.J.106 that
unless a state can assert a substantial governmental interest, it may not prohibit
lawyer speech. The state may not prohibit certain types of potentially
99. But cf. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922 (lay person's capacity to make a decision concerning
legal representation may be greatly impaired because the legal problem overwhelms the person).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1924.
102. Id. The Court stated that a state could require the letter to bear a label identifying it
as an "advertisement." By implication, however, it would seem that a state may require a cita-
tion letter to bear the label "solicitation."
103. Id.
104. But cf. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Profession: The Supreme Court's
Unanswered Question and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. R~v. 45, 113 (1985) ("Cooling
off" period is a time, perhaps three days, in which a consumer can rescind a contract for the
purchase of a good.).
105. See supra note 42, 43 and accompanying text.
106. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). A lawyer sent cards announcing the opening of his law office to
a list of selected addresses. A Missouri rule prohibited this mailing. The Court held that a state
may not regulate an attorney's commercial speech unless the speech is inherently or demonstrably
misleading or the regulation is narrowly drawn to prevent a specific and significant abuse.
1989]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
misleading information if the speech can be presented in a way that is not
deceptive.'0 7
The Kentucky Bar Association has refused to approve a dozen different
solicitation letters submitted by Mr. Shapero subsequent to the Shapero deci-
sion.10 8 The Kentucky Bar Association withheld approval because it found
the "pitches" of the letters objectionable. 10 9 In one letter, Shapero informed
individuals experiencing home foreclosure that he could put them into
bankruptcy to prevent the foreclosure. The Bar denied approval based on
the fact that bankruptcy might not be a viable option for some addressees."I0
Under Shapero, the denial would be valid because to some recipients this would
be misleading. However, if Mr. Shapero can phrase the letter so that it is
not misleading, the Kentucky Bar may not prevent its being distributed.
Criticism of the Methods of Regulation
Methods used by state.bar associations to regulate lawyer advertising create
some difficult questions. Most Bar Associations are short on funds and per-
sonnel to investigate specific complaints against lawyers.'II Additionally, agency
staff members are not trained to understand specific legal problems or to
discern if a lawyer's letter is misleading.' 2 Requiring state agencies to screen
lawyer letters and rewrite them to correct deficiencies could require additional
personnel, training, and funding."'
The Shapero majority discounted those well-established arguments that states
do not have the resources to monitor lawyer mailings.'" The Court stated
that nothing in the record established that scrutiny of solicitation letters would
be any more burdensome than scrutinizing advertisements.I' Yet, in the same
paragraph, the Court stated, "[tlo be sure, a state agency or bar association
that reviews solicitation letters might have more work than one that does
not.""' Arguably the Court's position appears to be contradictory; more work
would inevitably lead to higher costs and more burdens for the state agencies.
To comply with the Court's guidance that the free flow of information
107. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924.
108. He Can Advertise-But Only in Principle, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1988, at 21, col. 1.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1923. ABA House of Delegates in its comment to Rule 7.3 stated:
State lawyer discipline agencies struggle for resources to investigate specific com-
plaints, much less for those necessary to screen lawyers' mail solicitation material.
Even if they could examine such materials, agency staff members are unlikely to
know anything about the lawyer or about the prospective client's underlying problem.
Without such knowledge they cannot determine whether the lawyer's representations
are misleading.
Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1924.
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justifies the costs of regulation," 7 states might require lawyers to pay a filing
fee for the review of each targeted mail solicitation."' Suggesting the pre-
screening of any solicitation letter raises the issue of prior restraint. Prior
restraints are presumptively unconstitutional whenever they are used to ban
fully protected speech."19 Yet, lawyer solicitation has been defined as com-
mercial speech which does not enjoy full protection under the first amend-
ment.'20 The Supreme Court suggested in Central Hudson that the United
States Constitution will permit prior restraints on lawyer solicitation.' 21
Regulation of In-Person Solicitation for Business Representation
In Shapero, the Court reiterated its opposition to in-person solicitation
because neither the state nor the legal profession could effectively regulate
the possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, undue influence or
fraud.' 22 In-person solicitation for business representation, however, may be
susceptible to regulation. A businessperson could regulate the conduct of a
lawyer who displays any of the above-mentioned characteristics by spreading
the word throughout the business community not to hire the lawyer.
A lay person may spread the word about a lawyer's conduct in the same
fashion. Generally, however, the businessperson has more contact with people
who have complex and expensive legal problems. The businessperson's negative
revelations about a lawyer, therefore, could result in a substantial loss of
business for the lawyer. Realizing that this informal network could lead to
widespread knowledge about the solicitation practices of the lawyer could en-
courage the lawyer to comply with ethical standards.
Moreover, the state could regulate solicitation for business representation.
A state can already regulate the time, place and manner of lawyer solicita-
tion.'23 The state could specifically direct the lawyer to solicit the businessperson
at the regular place of business and only during regular business hours.
Although such strict regulation may interfere with the social aspect of soliciting
business, the regulation would aid the state in protecting the businessperson
from unethical solicitation. The state could also require the lawyer to provide
the businessperson with a list of other local lawyers who handle similar legal
problems. Finally, the state could require the lawyer to provide the business
person with the state regulatory agency for reporting attorney misconduct.
Commentators have suggested some of these same safeguards in order to
allow truthful, nondeceptive in-person solicitation of the general public.'24
117. Id.
118. See Perschbacher & Hamilton, Reading Beyond the Labels: Effective Regulation of Lawyers'
Targeted Direct Mail Advertising, 58 U. CoLo. LAW REv. 255, 276 (1987).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 278 n.153.
122. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922.
123. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
124. See Rabin, Attorney Solicitation: The Scope of State Regulation After Primus and Ohralik,
12 J. L. REFORM 144, 180-88 (1978).
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Although these safeguards may alleviate some of the dangers, the root of
the problem is that the lawyer has more potential to exploit the susceptibility
of a person with a personal legal problem than one with a business problem.
In Shapero, the Court determined that a state must ascertain whether a lawyer's
mode of communication poses a serious danger of exploiting a client's suscep-
tibility.' 2 Even though the Shapero Court restated its previous rule banning
in-person solicitation, the change in focus away from whether the client's con-
dition makes the client susceptible is critical. If a state cannot demonstrate
that in-person solicitation for business representation exploits the businessper-
son's susceptibility to undue influence, then Shapero provides an argument
for its constitutionality.
Proposed Rule
Shapero effectively held that Rule 7.3 is unconstitutional.' 26 Oklahoma had
already adopted Rule 7.3 and must now draft and adopt a new solicitation
rule. To avoid the need for continued redrafting, the Oklahoma Bar Associa-
tion should consider a broad solicitation rule based on Shapero. In addition,
the Rule should allow in-person solicitation for business representation.
Oklahoma should start with the Shapero opinion, the Kutak Commission's
1981 proposed final draft of Rule 7.3, the 1983 proposed draft of Rule 7.3,
and the ABA's Ethics Committee's proposed amendment to Rule 7.3.127 A
possible rule is suggested as follows:
A lawyer may initiate contact with a prospective client for the pur-
pose of obtaining professional employment only as follows:
(A) Written Contact-A lawyer may send a solicitation letter to
a potential client with a known legal problem if:
(1) The lawyer knows or has reason to belive that the client
is not already represented by a lawyer.' 2
(2) The letter contains only truthful, nondeceptive infor-
mation that does not mislead the client.' 2
9
(3) The letter makes no unreasonable claims about client
satisfation.11°
(4) The letter cannot contain any unreasonable informa-
tion which would cause the client to belive that the
lawyer has more than a general understanding of what
legal problem the client has.'
3 '
125. See supra notes 55, 79, 91 and accompanying text.
126. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1925.
127. See Stewart & Nelson v. Hawking Legal Serv., 74 ABA J. 44, 48 (Aug. 1, 1984).
128. 4 ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 381 (Nov. 23, 1988). Rhode
Island adopted a new Rule 7.3 on November 1, 1988. The new rule is based on the Shapero decision.
129. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1923.
130. Id. at 1925.
131. Id. at 1923.
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(5) The letter cannot contain any information which would
lead the client to believe that the client has a more
serious or different problem than the one known by
the lawyer. 132
(6) Form letters designed to be used after a disaster or
trauma must be submitted to the Bar for approval.
Complete letters referencing a particular event may be
sent to the client no earlier than two weeks after the
event. The completed letter must be filed with the Bar
within three days of mailing.'33
(7) The lawyer must submit verification of how the lawyer
learned of the client's problem. If the lawyer includes
facts relating to the circumstances of the legal problem,
the lawyer must submit a statement explaining how the
lawyer discovered and verified the accuracy.
3
1
(8) The body of the letter must contain a statement direc-
ting the recipient to report inaccurate or misleading let-
ters to the Oklahoma Bar Association.'
35
(9) The letter and the envelope must contain the words
"This is a solicitation." These words must appear in
a conspicuous location and be the same size print as
the rest of the letter.
36
(10) The lawyer sending such a letter must send a copy to
the Oklahoma Bar Association within three days of
mailing.
(B) In person or telephone contact-A lawyer may solicit legal
business in-person and cover the telephone subject to the
following provisions:
(1) If the potential client is a close friend, relative, former
client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to
be a client, the lawyer may solicit both personal and
business representation.'
37
(2) If the legal service is provided under the auspices of
a public or charitable legal service organization, the
lawyer may solicit both personal and business represen-
tation. 3 1
(3) If the legal service is provided under the auspices of
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1924.
135. Id.
136. See supra note 100.
137. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 7.3 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
138. Id.
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a bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee
or trade organization where purposes include providing
or recommending legal service, the lawyer may solicit
representation if related to the principal purposes of
the organization.
39
(4) If the potential client does not fall under (B)(1) above,
the lawyer may solicit only matters of business represen-
tation only at the recipient's usual place of business and
only during regular working hours. The lawyer may only
solicit the representation of personal legal business from
these recipients in writing and subject to (A) above and
Rules 7.1 and 7.2.
(C) Contact otherwise permitted by (A) and (B) above is not
allowed:
(1) If the person has made known to the lawyer a desire
not to receive communications from the lawyer;' 41 or
(2) The communication involves coercion, duress, or
harassment. 4 '
Conclusion
Shapero is yet another United State Supreme Court pronouncement extin-
guishing a state's right to categorically ban a particular type of lawyer solicita-
tion. No longer may a state claim a substantial governmental interest in restricting
lawyer solicitation merely because the solicitation may reach a potential client
whose condition makes the client susceptible to undue influence. A state may
regulate a mode of solicitation only if the mode poses a serious danger of
exploiting such susceptibility.
States may regulate targeted, direct mail solicitation using means far less
restrictive and more precise than an outright ban. Similarly, states may regulate
in-person solicitation for business representation through methods other than
prohibition. The Supreme Court has consistently struck down bans on lawyer
solicitation, emphasizing the importance of the free flow of lawyer information.
This consistency suggests that the Court may rule indiscriminate bans on in-
person solicitation unconstitutional. Oklahoma can avoid redrafting a new
rule each time the Court narrows the state's interest in restricting solicitation.
To accomplish this, Oklahoma should draft a rule which provides minimum
regulation of targeted, direct mail solicitation and allows in-person solicita-
tion for business representation.
Holly J. Harlow
139. Id.
140. See supra note 126.
141. Id.
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